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Abstract
We consider two differentiated products mixed markets, comprised of a state holding corporation (SHC) and
private firms, which decide strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and merger between the multiple
plants. In the model of managerial delegation, we show that the level of unilateral CSR by a single plant under
merger is higher than that under non-merger, but merged (non-merged) private firms can generate higher social
welfare when products are low (high) substitutes. We also show that the level of bilateral CSR by both plants
is lower than that of unilateral CSR under non-merger competition, and partial privatization is always optimal
regardless of merger decisions but its degree under merger is lower than that under non-merger. Finally, we
discuss policy implications of the firm’s strategic alliance in the case that merger is not voluntarily supportive.
Keywords: Strategic corporate social responsibility; Merger; Mixed market; State holding corporation;
1. Introduction
Over the last decades, privatization policy has been a prevailing trend in the world. The welfare consequence
of privatization programs is a fundamental question and thus, it is a controversial subject among policy-makers
and public watchers.1 Yet, several significant industries such as banking, finance, energy, electricity, manufacture
and transportation sectors remain under the government’s control and management.25
Since the government runs multiple enterprises with various sector of production, the state holding cor-
poration (SHC) is considered as an alternative way of retaining assets in addition to privatizing to potential
buyers. That is, state-owned enterprises that would not be privatized can be formed as a single entity and
Email addresses: mariellealc@tec.mx (Mariel Leal), aru.gmtz@hotmail.com (Arturo Garcia), sangho@jnu.ac.kr
(Corresponding author) (Sang-Ho Lee)
1For comprehensive research on privatization, see Armstrong et al. (1994) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 1991). For recent cases
of privatization programs, see Nepal and Foster (2015) and Winston and Yan (2011).
2According to an OECD report by Kowalski et al. (2013), of the 2000 largest public companies in the world, more than 10%are
either SOEs or have significant government ownership; these government-associated companies’ sales are equivalent to approximately
6% of the global GDP.
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administered under a new management established as a SHC.3 For example, in China, Korea and Japan, state
owned enterprise in postal service entered logistic sectors, that in railways industry is supplying travel services,10
and that in banking industry is providing insurance services. All those industries are mixed markets where the
state owned enterprise competes with private enterprises.4
In reality, many private enterprises also comprise private holding corporations (PHCs) that produces various
types of goods at various production plants.5 As a result, corporations are indeed multiproduct firms. Typical
examples include consumer markets for automobiles, PCs, and air travels, as well as business markets for15
processed materials, computer servers, and various types of industrial machinery.6
These facts stress the importance of investigating the market performace with PHCs that produce several
differentiated goods in the presence of SHC. Further, in the process of various privatization programs it is
urgent for antitrust agency to investigate the welfare effect of merger behaviors of PHCs in mixed markets. A
few recent works including Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2017), Dong et al. (2018), and Kawasaki and Matsuzaki20
(2020) have considered mixed markets where the SHC competes with private firms or PHC. However, previous
works assumed that an industry is consist of pure private firms that have homogeneous objectives to maximize
their profits only.
There is another trend in organization and ownership structure in globalized market environment. Corporate
social responsibility (CSR) waves are explosively expanding today and the firm’s voluntary engagement of CSR25
activities has become a global business practice.7 Among many other classifications of CSR, as an instrument
3The OECD (2005) reports that the EU governments are the largest shareholders in many partially privatized firms in EU
countries. State control is also signicant in Asian countries such as Japan, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand. In these countries, publicly-owned firms are usually organised as SHCs and produce various types of products at various
production plants. See also The Reporter (17 November 2018), ”Government contemplates merger of public enterprises under a
holding company.”
4De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and Matsumura (1998) firstly examined a mixed market and justified privatizing public firms
when the number of private firms is sufficient or they are efficient. Since they open a new and interesting field of mixed oligopolies,
controversial debates among researchers are on going until now. For discussion on optimal privatization policy, see Lee and Hwang
(2003), Matsumura and Kanda (2005), Fujiwara (2007), Lee et al. (2018), and Xu and Lee (2019) among others.
5Multiproduct firms are omnipresent in modern economies as pointed out in Kumar (1992) and Eckel and Neary (2010). Recent
studies on multiproduct competition include Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2017); Ba´rcena-Ruiz et al. (2020), Armstrong and Vickers
(2018) and Johnson and Rhodes (2019).
6The factors that influence the decision to merge by private firms and the effects of that decision on social welfare have been
heavily analyzed by the literature on mergers. For recent works, Farrell and Shapiro (2010), Nocke and Whinston (2010, 2013) and
Jaffe and Weyl (2013) have influenced antitrust practice.
7The global phenomenon that firms concern with CSR has been also confirmed by various surveys, such as KPMG (2013, 2015)
and UN Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study (2010, 2013). According to the PWC Global CEO survey (2016), for example, 64%
of the CEOs see CSR as a core part of their business and 59% of them believe social values are important to attract top employees.
Furthermore, the importance of CSR is expected to rise within the next 5 years, and 87% of the companies become aware of the
strategic dimension of societal outcome measurement.
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for profit creation, there has been also great amount of studies seek to explain or understand firms’ strategic
profit-maximizing use of CSR.8 These studies help to explain the role of CSR in competitive markets dominated
by a few private profit-maximizing firms.
Recent theoretical study on incentives of CSR concerned by private firms when they compete with state-30
owned firms has just caught attention of research scholars. For examples, Ouattara (2017), Itano (2017) and
Kim et al. (2019) examined optimal privatization policies with the CSR activities of a private firm in mixed
markets. These works assumed that the level of CSR is exogenously given. To our knowledge, studies on how
private firms decide on the strategic level of CSR competing with welfare maximizing firms are limited. One
exception is the paper by Dong and Wang (2019), who consider a mixed oligopoly where a private firm in35
a managerial delegation contract competes with a SHC with differentiated products and show that the level
of CSR depends on the degree of privatization of the SHC and the degree of substitution between products.
However, it does not consider strategic merger decision of the firms as a PHC.
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature on the subject of merger and CSR in mixed
markets where many heterogenous firms coexist. Our approach is close to Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003),40
but they did not consider the CSR activities of the merged firms. We will extend and study how private firms
decide on the level of CSR competiting with a welfare-maximizing SHC and how the strategic CSR is related
with merger decision among the private firms. We analyze the decision of private firms whether to merge when
SHC exists, and how to use the strategic CSR for its own profit-maximizing purpose.
In particular, we consider two product differentiated mixed markets comprised of a SHC and a private sector.45
The SHC owns two production plants, each of which produces a differentiated good. The private sector also
comprises two private plants, each of which produces a differentiated good. One or two of private firms might
adopt CSR and also consider whether to merge with rival private firm to form a PHC or not. We then examine
the private firm’s decisions of strategic CSR and merger in the process of output competition in mixed markets
with SHC. Our goal is to investigate how the merger decision of the private firm is relate to the strategic50
incentives of CSR.
Our main findings are as follows: First, the strategic level of unilateral CSR by a single plant under merger
is higher than that under non-merger even though private firms compete with either a fully nationalized or
semi-public SHC. That is, the CSR-firm is more aggressive in production under merger in mixed markets. This
is because merger can internalize the inter-products substitution effects between the two competing markets,55
which brings about more reduction of the SHC’s output especially when the substitutability between the two
products is low.
8Many researchers have considered the strategic approach in consumer-friendly activities since Goering (2007), Kopel and Brand
(2012), Kopel (2015), and Lambertini and Tampieri (2015). Further, recent works on the environmental concerns have been also
gaining academic attention. See Liu et al. (2015), Lee and Park (2019), and Hirose et al. (2017, 2020).
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In presence of a fully nationalized SHC, we then show that merged (non-merged) competition with a unilateral
CSR can generate the highest social welfare unless products are (not) close substitutes. We also show that the
strategic CSR between the two private firms is strategic substitutes and thus the level of bilateral CSR by60
both private plants is lower than that of unilateral CSR under non-merged competition. However, bilateral
CSR encourages more competition in the market and thus generates lower market prices and higher consumer
surplus than those of unilateral CSR under non-merged competition. As a result, merged competition with a
bilateral CSR might yield the lowest social welfare regardless of products differentiation.
In presence of a semi-public SHC, we also show that partial privatization is always optimal, regardless of65
merger, but its degree under merger is lower than that under non-merger. We then confirm that our findings
under a fully nationalized SHC still hold under a semi-public SHC.
Finally, we show that merger decisions depend on whether or not side payments between firms are allowed
in the case of unilateral CSR,9 whereas a merger is always voluntarily achievable and joint profits are increasing
in the case of bilateral CSR. We then show that a merger is achievable and always profitable for both private70
firms if side payments between insiders within the merged firm are permitted. If such side payments are not
permitted and thus a merger is not achievable, we further consider a strategic alliance and reveal that strategic
alliance is not only profitable for the private firms but socially beneficial, which is Pareto-improving result.
The organization of this article is as follows: In section 2, we provide a basic model of a unilateral CSR. In
section 3, we analyze non-merged case and merged case, respectively, and compare the equilibrium outcomes.75
We discuss some policy implications in section 4, which includes the competition effect of bilateral CSR, the
optimal degree of privatization policy, and the welfare effect of strategic alliance. Finally, section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. The Model
We consider two differentiated products markets with a state-holding corporation (SHC), firm A, which has80
two plants and produces goods in market 1 and 2, denoted by A1 and A2, respectively, and two uniplant private
firms in each market, denoted by B1, and B2, respectively. When firm B1 and firm B2 merge (or when one of
them acquires the other), we assume that they can set up a multiproduct corporation after the merger, which
has two divisions/plants, each producing one goods.
On the demand side, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type. The representative consumer
has a utility function U(q1, q2), which is quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in q1 and q2: U(q1, q2) =
9Although cross-subsidization is pretty widespread within multi-product firms, agreeing on side payments may often be difficult.
Peck and Temple (2002) emphasize that technological change may have important effects on many different aspects of the firms’
operation, including production costs, demand, and product lines, thus making it difficult for the merging parties to agree on
suitable transfers between them.
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(q1 + q2)− ((q
2
1 + 2γq1q2 + q
2
2))/2, where γ ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of product differentiation and qki is the
output produced by firm or plant ki, k = A,B; i = 1, 2. Then, the consumer maximizes U(q1, q2)− p1q1− p2q2,
where pi is the price of good i, q1 = qA1+ qB1 and q2 = qA2+ qB2 are the quantity of good 1 and 2 respectively.
The inverse demand functions are linear and given by:
pi = 1− (qAi + qBi)− γ(qAj + qBj), i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2; (1)
Note that the products are regarded as highly substitutes if γ approaches 1 while independent if γ = 0.85
On the supply side, we assume that firms have identical technologies represented by the following quadratic
cost function: C(qki) =
q2ki
2 , k = A,B; i = 1, 2. Thus, the profit function of a plant or firm ki is:
πki = piqki −
q2ki
2
(2)
The social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus in both markets:
W = CS + PS = CS + πA + πB1 + πB2; (3)
where CS = ((qA1 + qB1)
2 + 2γ(qA1 + qB1)(qA2 + qB2) + (qA2 + qB2)
2)/2 and πA = πA1 + πA2.
We assume that a SHC is fully owned by a government and maximizes the social welfare.10 Regarding the
objective of the private firms, firm B1 and firm B2, we assume that both are profit-maximizing firms with the
asymmetry between the private firms, as in Fanti and Buccella (2017) and Kim et al. (2019). In specific, we
regard firm B1 as a managerial firm where production decision is delegated to a manager. That is, the owner of
firm B1 specifies an incentive contract with the manager in order to maximize its profit. Then, the manager is
assumed to maximize the following objective function, i.e., the profit of firm B1 plus a fraction (θ) of consumer
surplus (CS) in production:11
V = πB1 + θ1CS (4)
where parameter θi ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of concern on consumer surplus when the firm adopts CSR
activities, i.e., the level of CSR. That is, the private firm B1 is a CSR firm. However, we assume that the
private firm B2 is a pure profit-maximizing firm.12
The private firms, B1 and B2, can decide to merge and set up a multiproduct firm with two divisions,
1 and 2. If they merge, the profit of the owner and the objective function of the manager in a multiplant
10We will also consider a semi-public SHC and examine optimal degree of privatization in section 5 and Appendix A.
11Note that we consider consumer surplus as the proxy of CSR, which has been widely utilized in related literature. For more
discussion in recent works, see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Bian and Li (2016), Garcia et al. (2019), Dong and Wang (2019),
and Leal et al. (2018, 2019, 2020a) among others.
12In section 5, we will consider a symmetric case that both firms are managerial firms where production decision is delegated to
a manager while the level of CSR is determined by the owner. We then examine the homogeneity of the objectives between the
firms in the competitive decisions of CSR.
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CSR-corporation (CC) are, respectively:13
πB = πB1 + πB2 (5)
VB = πB + θCS (6)
Our goal is to investigate the merger incentives of the CSR firm when it competes with a SHC, and the relations90
between strategic CSR and merger decisions.
The game runs as follows14: In stage 1, both CSR and private firms decide whether to merge and set up
a multiproduct CSR firm. In stage 2, the owner of a CSR firm determines its degree of CSR. Finally, both
firms compete with outputs in the last stage. The subgame perfect equilibrium will be derived by backward
induction.95
3. Analysis
Given that private firms will decide whether to merge or not, we have two cases. In the first case, private
firms do not merge, in which a SHC competes with two independent private firms, which will be denoted by the
superscript ⋆ . In the second case, firms merge and set up a multiproduct CSR firm, in which a SHC competes
with a CSR-corporation, which will be denoted by the superscript †. We will analyze the two cases, respectively.100
3.1. Non-merged competition
In the last stage, we solve equilibrium output decisions of the game under non-merger. When there is a SHC
competing with two independent private firms. The SHC chooses the output level of its two plants, qA1 and
qA2 that maximise eqn. (3). The manager of firm B1 chooses the output qB1 that maximises (4) while firm B2
chooses output qB2 to maximise its profit given by eqn. (2).105
From the first-order conditions, the respond functions are derived as
qAi =
1− γqAj − qBi − γqBj
2
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2
qB1 =
1− (1− θ1)qA1 − (γ − γθ1)qA2 − (γ − γθ1)qB2
3− θ1
qB2 =
1
3
(1− γqA1 − qA2 − γqB1) (7)
13Following Garcia et al. (2020), we assume that a CSR-corporation (CC) maximizes the joint profits in a managerial delegation
contract in which the owners of the CC delegate the managers the output production in order to maximize the joint profits plus a
fraction (θ) of consumer surplus (CS). Note also that if the two merged firms have different objective functions before the merger,
then it is reasonable to assume that the merged firm maximizes the weighted average of the payoff of the two firms. For related
analysis, see Matsumura (1998) and Lee and Hwang (2003) examined partial ownership and Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003)
examined the merger between the welfare-maximizing public firm and the profit-maximizing private firm, respectively.
14Note that the decision of whether to merge or not precedes the CSR decision, as the former is typically a longer-term issue.
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From (7), it is easy to see that output of firm A (qAi, i = 1, 2) decreases with that of private firm Bi,
and the output produced by one plant of firm A decreases with that of the other, i.e. outputs are strategic
substitutes. In addition, the output of private firm Bi decreases with that of firm A (qAi, i = 1, 2). Solving
them, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. When a SHC competes with two uniplant private firms, the outputs are
q⋆A1 =
10− 6γ −
(
5− 3γ2
)
θ1
25− 9γ2 − (5− 3γ2) θ1
; q⋆A2 =
2(5− 3γ − θ1)
25− 9γ2 − (5− 3γ2) θ1
q⋆B1 =
5− 3γ +
(
5 + 3γ − 3γ2
)
θ1
25− 9γ2 − (5− 3γ2) θ1
; q⋆B2 =
5− 3γ − θ1
25− 9γ2 − (5− 3γ2) θ1
By Lemma 1 it can be checked that
∂q⋆Ai
∂θ1
< 0,
∂q⋆B1
∂θ1
> 0 and
∂q⋆B2
∂θ1
< 0. Therefore,
∂q⋆
1
∂θ1
> 0 and
∂q⋆
2
∂θ1
< 0 where110
qi = qAi + qBi. Then, there exists an inter-products substitution effect between the firms in market i and an
inter-markets substitution effect between the markets A and B. Both effects go to the same direction where the
CSR-firm’s output always increases with CSR effort while both SHC and private firms’ outputs always decrease
with CSR effort. Further, from last 2 inequalities, we have that the market 1’s output always increases with
CSR effort while market 2’s output always decreases with CSR effort.115
We now proceed to the second stage of the game in which the owner of CSR firm determines its degree of
CSR. That is, the owner of firm B1 chooses θ to maximize its profits given by (2). Thus, we obtain the following
result:
Lemma 2. When a SHC competes with two uniplant private firms:
θ⋆ =
25− 15γ
125 + 45γ − 120γ2 − 18γ3 + 27γ4
;
q⋆A1 =
3(5− 3γ)
(
5− 2γ2
)
(10− 3γ2) (20− 9γ2)
; q⋆A2 =
2
(
40− 25γ − 15γ2 + 9γ3
)
(10− 3γ2) (20− 9γ2)
;
q⋆B1 =
5− 3γ
20− 9γ2
; q⋆B2 =
40− 25γ − 15γ2 + 9γ3
(10− 3γ2) (20− 9γ2)
;
π⋆B1 =
(5− 3γ)2
2 (200− 150γ2 + 27γ4)
; π⋆B2 =
3
(
40− 25γ − 15γ2 + 9γ3
)2
2 (200− 150γ2 + 27γ4)
2
By Lemma 2 it can be shown that θ⋆ > 0 and thus the positive level of CSR can be utilized by the CSR
firm for the profit-maximizing purpose. Also, it can be checked that the relationship between θ and γ is non-120
monotone, i.e., ∂θ
⋆
∂γ
>
<
0 if γ>
<
γ¯ and ∂
2θ⋆
∂γ2
> 0, where γ¯ satisfies that ∂θ
⋆
∂γ
= 0 and γ¯ ≈ 0.636. That is, when
the differentiation between products is sufficiently high, the optimal CSR level decreases with the degree of
substitution. However, when the degree of substitution is increased past a certain level, the optimal CSR begins
increasing with the degree of substitution. Therefore, the degree of product differentiation plays a key role in
determining the strategic level of CSR under non-merged competition.125
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3.2. Merged competition
In the last stage, we solve equilibrium output decisions of the game under merger. When the two private
firms merge, they set up a multiproduct CC that chooses the values of qB1 and qB2 that maximize (6). Then,
according the first-order conditions, the respond functions for the SHC are the same as the previous case, while
the respond functions for CC are derived as:
qBi =
1− (1− θ)qAi − (γ − γθ)qAj − γ(2− θ)qBj
3− θ
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2
Solving them, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. When a SHC competes with a CC, the outputs are
q†Ai =
2 + γ − θ(1 + γ)
5 + 5γ + γ2 − θ(1 + γ)
, q†Bi =
1 + θ(1 + γ)
5 + 5γ + γ2 − θ(1 + γ)
i = 1, 2
By Lemma 3 it can be checked that
∂q
†
Ai
∂θ
< 0,
∂q
†
Bi
∂θ
> 0 and
∂q
†
i
∂θ
> 0. Then, merger generates the
internalization effect between the differentiated products a multiproduct CC internalizes how the output of one
of its plants affect that of its other plant, which encourages to increase the total outputs of its plants. That130
is, from last inequality, unlike the non-merged case, since merger can generate more aggressive production, the
market outputs always increase with CSR effort. However, an intra-products substitution effect in the market
still exists where the CC’s output always increases with CSR effort while SHC’s outputs always decrease with
CSR effort.
We now proceed to the second stage of the game in which a CC determines its degree of CSR. That is, the135
owner(s) of CC chooses θ to maximize the joint-profits given by (5). Thus, we get:
Lemma 4. When a SHC competes with a CC:
θ† =
1 + γ
5 + 3γ
;
q†Ai =
3 + 2γ
(2 + γ)(4 + 3γ)
; q†Bi =
1
4 + 3γ
π†B =
1
(2 + γ)(4 + 3γ)
By Lemma 4 it can be checked that ∂θ
†
∂γ
> 0 and ∂
2θ†
∂γ2
< 0. It means that the degree of product differentiation
also plays a key role in determining the strategic level of CSR under merged competition. However, unlike non-
merged case, the CSR monotonically increases with the degree of substitution, and this effect is weakened as
the degree of substitution increases.140
3.3. Comparisons
We will compare the levels of strategic CSR in the two cases:
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Proposition 1. The strategic level of CSR under merger is higher than that under non-merger.
Proof. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, we have that for any γ ∈ [0, 1)
θ† − θ⋆ =
γ
(
170− 30γ − 138γ2 + 9γ3 + 27γ4
)
(5 + 3γ) (125 + 45γ − 120γ2 − 18γ3 + 27γ4)
≥ 0
Proposition 1 states that merger will encourage the level of CSR, but its effect depends non-monotonically on145
the degree of product differentiation. In addition, the difference between the levels of CSR increases (decreases)
as the substitutability increases when the substitutability is low (high), i.e., ∂(θ
†−θ⋆)
∂γ
>
<
0 if γ<
>
0.77. Thus, the
CSR-firm can be more aggressive in production under merger in the presence of a SHC since it can internalize
its own inter-products substitution effects between the two markets, which brings about more reduction of the
SHC’s output especially when the substitutability is not high.15150
Regarding the equilibrium outputs and prices in the two cases, we have the followings:
Lemma 5. Comparing the equilibrium outputs and prices in the two cases, we have:
(i) q⋆
A1
+ q⋆
A2
<
>
q†
A1
+ q†
A2
if γ>
<
γ1 where γ1 satisfies that q
⋆
A1
+ q⋆
A2
= q†
A1
+ q†
A2
and γ1 ≈ 0.790.
(ii) q⋆B1 ≥ q
†
B1, q
⋆
B2 < q
†
B2 while q
⋆
B1 + q
⋆
B2
<
>
q†B1 + q
†
B2 if γ
<
>
γ1.
(iii) q⋆1 ≥ q
†
1 while q
⋆
2 < q
†
2 where qi = qAi + qBi, i = 1, 2.155
(iv) p⋆1 ≤ p
†
1 while p
⋆
2
<
>
p†2 if γ
>
<
0.913
Lemma 5 shows that (i) a SHC increases (decreases) its outputs from rivals’ merger when products are
relatively high (low) substitutes. (ii) Regarding CSR firm’s output after the merger, due to the internalization
effect under merged case, firm B1’s output decreases while firm B2’s output increases, but the joint production
of the private firms increases (decreases) when products are relatively low (high) substitutes. These two findings160
imply that there is output substitution effect between the SHC and the merged CC while cost saving effect arises
unless products are relatively high substitutes.16 Also, (iii) total outputs in market 1 (2) can decrease (increase)
after the merger, but (iv) price in market 1 before merger is lower than that after merger while price in market
15As shown in Lee and Xu (2018) and Leal et al. (2020b), in an endogenous timing game in a mixed market where the public firm
competes with a private firm and both firms decide the timing of movement, it is well-known that in the equilibrium the private
firm produces the production more aggressively as a Stackelberg leader while the public firm follows, which can also increase the
social welfare because the output substitution effect between the firms can also accompany with cost-saving effect of the public
firm. Regarding these effects, see the descriptions in Lemma 5.
16Note that SHC cares for the whole amount of CS whereas CC cares for a partial amount of CS. It brings about higher output
and higher production cost to the SHC. Therefore, if output substitution arises between the SHC and CC, then cost-saving effect
also arises when the SHC decreases its output.
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2 after merger can be lower than that before merger when products are sufficiently differentiated. That is, when
products are not close substitutes, consumers are also better off.165
These findings are different with the single product case. As shown in Lambertini and Tampieri (2015),
Leal et al. (2018) and Garcia et al. (2019), a higher level of CSR implies aggressive output production in a
single product market. However, Lemma 5 shows that a higher level of CSR in a multi-product market does
not always implies more output production. Only when products are sufficiently differentiated, a higher level
of CSR encourages not only the output production of CC but total industry outputs.170
We shall now analyze whether private firms want to merge and set up a CC. We will consider two cases of
merger decision. The first case is a voluntary decision on merger in which both firms will accept the merger if
the profit that they will obtain in the multiproduct firm,
π
†
B
2 , is greater than the profit obtained when competing
as 2 uniplant private firms, π⋆Bi i = 1, 2. It implies that the merger decision does not allow for side payment in
the process of merger.17 The second case allows for side payment between the firms and thus both firms will175
merge if total joint profits, π†B , is greater than the sum of profits obtained when competing as 2 uniplant private
firms, π⋆B1 + π
⋆
B2.
Then, we have the followings:
Lemma 6. Comparing profits in the two cases, we have:
(i) π⋆B1 >
π
†
B
2 while π
⋆
B2 <
π
†
B
2 for any γ ∈ [0, 1).180
(ii) π⋆B1 + π
⋆
B2 < π
†
B for any γ ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 6 states that (i) CSR firm B1 prefers to remain as a uniplant firm while firm B2 prefers to merge.
Therefore, without side-payments they will not voluntarily merge. It also states that (ii) both firms will better
off after merger when side payments are allowed. Therefore, our result depends on whether or not side payments
between firms are allowed.185
Proposition 2. When side payments between insiders within the merged firm are permitted, a merger is achiev-
able and always profitable for both firms. When such side payments are not permitted, however, a merger is not
voluntarily achievable even though its joint profits are increasing.
Finally, we will compare the consumer surplus and welfare in the two cases:
Proposition 3. Comparing the consumer surplus and welfare in the two cases, we have:190
17Note that although cross-subsidization is pretty widespread within multi-product firms, agreeing on side payments may often
be difficult. According to Peck and Temple (2002), technological change may have important effects on many different aspects
of the firms’ operation, including production costs, demand, and product lines, thus making it difficult for the merging parties to
agree on suitable transfers between them. The assumption of no side payments between insiders within the merged firm is in line
with the concept of pairwise stability in network formation. For more discussion, see Kesavayuth et al. (2018).
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(i) CS⋆ <
>
CS† if γ<
>
γ2 where γ2 satisfies that CS
⋆ = CS† and γ2 ≈ 0.784
(ii) W ⋆ <
>
W † if γ<
>
γ3 where γ3 satisfies that W
⋆ =W † and γ3 ≈ 0.972
Proof. (i) The difference of consumer surplus between under non-merged and under merged competition is
as follows: CS† − CS⋆ = 78400+28000γ−200500γ
2−94020γ3+156855γ4+80550γ5−48762γ6−26082γ7+5346γ8+2916γ9
2(2+γ)2(4+3γ)2(10−3γ2)2(20−9γ2)2
and this
expression is equal to zero when γ = γ2. (ii) The difference of welfare between under non-merged and under195
merged competition is as follows: W †−W ⋆ = 10400−3200γ−20850γ
2+4255γ3+14850γ4−1800γ5−4482γ6+243γ7+486γ8
(2+γ)(4+3γ)2(10−3γ2)2(20−9γ2)2
and
this expression is equal to zero when γ = γ3.
Proposition 3 states that the differences of consumer surplus and welfare under merger decision depends
crucially on the degree of product differentiation. That is, merged competition can generate higher consumer200
surplus and welfare when products are not close substitutes where total industry outputs under merger in-
creases. Meanwhile, non-merged competition enhances higher consumer surplus and welfare when products
are very similar where total industry outputs under merger decreases. In the case that the degree of product
differentiation is intermediate, i.e., 0.784 < γ < 0.972, output decreasing effect from merger will be outweighed
by the cost-saving effect arised from the intra-products substitution effect between the SHC and CC.205
From the viewpoint of society, therefore, merger decision by the antitrust agency in mixed markets should
consider not only the degree of product differentiation but the strategic level of CSR. This result suggests detailed
information on the products and market coverage is required if a government intends to encourage private firm
be more consumer-friendly in mixed markets where merger decision by the private firms is important.
4. Discussions210
In this section, we extend the analysis and examine policy implications of the findings. We first consider
a symmetric case of bilateral CSR where both private firms adopt CSR competitively in a same managerial
delegation framework. We also examine the optimal degree of privatization of SHC. Finally, we discuss on the
welfare effect of strategic alliance when the side payments are not allowed between the private firms in the
process of merger decision.215
4.1. Bilateral CSR
We consider the symmetric case that firm B2 is also a CSR firm, whose manager maximizes πB2 + θ2CS
and its owner maximizes πB2, as analyzed in Bian and Li (2016) and Fanti and Buccella (2017). The game runs
as before, except stage 2 in which both CSR firms determine the levels of CSR simultaneously.18 The subgame
18Note that the results under merger are the same as in Lemma 4 in which an SHC competes with a CC, since the merger takes
place between two CSR firms.
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perfect equilibrium will be derived by backward induction.220
In the last stage, we solve equilibrium output decisions of the game under non-merger. The SHC chooses
the output level of its two plants, qA1 and qA2 that maximise eqn. (3). The firm Bi´s manager chooses the
output qBi that maximises πBi + θiCS; i = 1, 2, respectively.
Solving the first-order conditions, we obtain the following Lemma where the superscript ⋆⋆ denotes the
equilibrium of the bilateral CSR under non-merged competition.225
Lemma 7. When a SHC competes with two uniplant CSR firms, the outputs are
q⋆⋆A1 =
2(5−3γ−θ2)−θ1(5−3γ2−(1−γ2)θ2)
25−9γ2−(5−3γ2)θ2−θ1(5−3γ2−(1−γ2)θ2)
; q⋆⋆A2 =
10−6γ−(5−3γ2)θ2−θ1(2−(1−γ2)θ2)
25−9γ2−(5−3γ2)θ2−θ1(5−3γ2−(1−γ2)θ2)
q⋆⋆B1 =
5−3γ−θ2+θ1(5+3γ−3γ2−(1−γ2)θ2)
25−9γ2−(5−3γ2)θ2−θ1(5−3γ2−(1−γ2)θ2)
; q⋆⋆B2 =
5−3γ+(5+3γ−3γ2)θ2−θ1(1+(1−γ2)θ2)
25−9γ2−(5−3γ2)θ2−θ1(5−3γ2−(1−γ2)θ2)
We now proceed to the second stage of the game in which both CSR firms´ owners determine their CSR
degree simultaneously. That is, the owner of firm Bi chooses θi to maximize its profits πBi. In the process
of examining the first-order conditions, we can note that the reaction functions are downward sloping; i.e.
∂θi
∂θj
< 0, i 6= j = 1, 2, which implies that the strategic levels of CSR by the both firms are strategic substitutes.19
Further, taking into account that firms are symmetric, then the equilibrium levels of CSR from the reaction230
curves are symmetric. Then, setting θ1 = θ2 = θ
⋆⋆ at equilibrium, we obtain the following result:
Lemma 8. When a SHC competes with two uniplant CSR firms:
θ⋆⋆ =
26 + 25γ − 9γ2 − 9γ3 − ψ
2(1 + γ) (5− 3γ2)
;
q⋆⋆Ai =
−6− 25γ − 3γ2 + 9γ3 + ψ
24 + 5γ − 21γ2 − 9γ3 + ψ
; q⋆⋆Bi =
36 + 25γ − 15γ2 − 9γ3 − ψ
24 + 5γ − 21γ2 − 9γ3 + ψ
π⋆⋆Bi =
3
(
16 + 25γ − 3γ2 − 9γ3 − ψ
) (
−36− 25γ + 15γ2 + 9γ3 + ψ
)
2 (24 + 5γ − 21γ2 − 9γ3 + ψ)
2 i = 1, 2.
where ψ :=
√
576 + 1200γ + 217γ2 − 858γ3 − 369γ4 + 162γ5 + 81γ6 > 0 for any γ ∈ [0, 1). As in the case
where an SHC competes with two uniplant private firms, we can show that θ⋆⋆ > 0 and the relationship between
θ and γ is non-monotone, i.e., ∂θ
⋆⋆
∂γ
>
<
0 if γ>
<
γˆ and ∂
2θ⋆⋆
∂γ2
> 0, where γˆ satisfies that ∂θ
⋆⋆
∂γ
= 0 and γˆ ≈ 0.694.
Proposition 4. Bilateral CSR reduces the level of CSR compared to unilateral CSR, that is, θ⋆ ≥ θ⋆⋆.235
Proof. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 8, we have that for any γ ∈ [0, 1)
θ⋆ − θ⋆⋆ = −1917γ
5+81γ6+243γ7−27γ4(31−ψ)−125(24−ψ)+60γ2(47−2ψ)+6γ3(823−3ψ)−5γ(839−9ψ)
2(1+γ)(5−3γ2)(125+45γ−120γ2−18γ3+27γ4) ≥ 0
19As well-known in the managerial delegation literature, strategic choices of bonus incentives are strategic substitutes and thus
there is another version of prisoner’s dilemma. Regarding CSR competition, see Fanti and Buccella (2017, 2018).
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Proposition 4 comes from the fact that the levels of CSR are strategic substitutes. That is, when the CSR-
firm adopts CSR, it chooses higher level of CSR when the rival firm does not adopt CSR but it reduces its level
of CSR when the rival firm also adopts CSR. Thus, competitive adoption of CSR discourage the level of CSR
in order to reduce over-adoption of CSR. It also implies that merger can encourage higher level of CSR since it240
can also eliminate the competitive effect of CSR.
Corollary 1. The strategic level of CSR under merger is higher than the bilateral CSR under non-merger.
Proof. From Proposition 1 and 4, it easy to show that θ† ≥ θ⋆ ≥ θ⋆⋆ for any γ ∈ [0, 1).
Regarding the equilibrium outputs and prices between unilateral and bilateral CSR, we have the followings:
Lemma 9. Comparing the equilibrium outputs and prices between unilateral and bilateral CSR, we have that245
for any γ ∈ [0, 1)
(i) q⋆
A1
+ q⋆
A2
> q⋆⋆
A1
+ q⋆⋆
A2
(ii) q⋆B1 ≥ q
⋆⋆
B1, q
⋆
B2 < q
⋆⋆
B2 while q
⋆
B1 + q
⋆
B2 < q
⋆⋆
B1 + q
⋆⋆
B2
(iii) q⋆1 ≥ q
⋆⋆
1 while q
⋆
2 < q
⋆⋆
2 where qi = qAi + qBi, i = 1, 2.
(iv) p⋆1 ≥ p
⋆⋆
1 and p
⋆
2 > p
⋆⋆
2 .250
(v) CS⋆ < CS⋆⋆ and W ⋆ < W ⋆⋆
Lemma 9 represents the welfare consequence of output substitution effect between the three firms. First, (i) a
SHC decreases its outputs under bilateral CSR. Second, (ii) regarding each firm’s output, due to the competitive
effect of CSR, firm B1 decreases its level of CSR and thus decreases its output while firm B2 increases its level
of CSR and thus increases its output. Since a SHC decreases its output, the total outputs of the two CSR-firms255
also increase. Third, (iii) total outputs in market 1 (2) decreases (increases) under bilateral CSR. However,
(iv) market prices in both markets decrease under bilateral CSR. As a result, the competitive adoption of CSR
under bilateral CSR is always better than unilateral CSR in terms of consumer surplus and welfare.20
Finally, we consider the decision of whether bilateral CSR-firms want to merge and set up a CC, and measure
the welfare effect of merger decision. Then, we will compare the profits, consumer surplus and welfare between260
under non-merger and merger in the case of bilateral CSR:
Proposition 5. Under bilateral CSR, we have that for any γ ∈ [0, 1),
(i) Both uni-plant CSR firms prefer to merge and they will voluntarily do so. That is, π⋆⋆Bi ≤
π
†
B
2
20Note that single plant firm B2 obtains higher profit when it adopts CSR. We can show that pi⋆
B1
≥ pi⋆⋆
B1
meanwhile pi⋆
B2
< pi⋆⋆
B2
.
That is, CSR-firm B1 reduces its output, which results in the reduction of profit. However, CSR-firm B2 increases its output even
though market prices decrease. Thus, the firm B2 can increase its profit since the output effect outweighs the price effect.
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(ii) Both consumer surplus and social welfare under merger decrease compared to those under non-merged
competition. That is, CS⋆⋆ ≥ CS†, and W ⋆⋆ ≥W †265
Proof. First, it is easy to compare the profits between the merged case and the non-merged competition with
bilateral CSR and show the results. Second, the consumer surplus and social welfare under non-merged com-
petition are the following, respectively:
CS⋆⋆ =
36(1+γ)(5−3γ2)
2
(24+5γ−21γ2−9γ3+ψ)2
;
W ⋆⋆ =
4(−486+459γ4−135γ5−81γ6+36ψ−25γ(51−ψ)+γ3(858−9ψ)−γ2(421+15ψ))
(24+5γ−21γ2−9γ3+ψ)2
Therefore, we can show that CS⋆⋆ − CS† ≥ 0 for any γ ∈ [0, 1). Also, W ⋆⋆ −W † ≥ 0 for any γ ∈ [0, 1).
Proposition 5 states that in the case of bilateral CSR, the consumer surplus and welfare under merger always
decrease irrespective of the degree of product differentiation. That is, merger decision by the private firms is
anti-competitive if a government can encourage all the private firms in the market to be more consumer-friendly270
in mixed markets. Therefore, merger decision by the antitrust agency in mixed markets should take care of each
firm’s strategic level of CSR into policy consideration.
4.2. Optimal privatization
We consider the case that a semi-public SHC exists instead of a fully nationalized SHC, and investigate the
optimal degree of privatization policy.21 Then, the objective of the semi-public SHC, firm A, is given as the
weighted average of social welfare and its own profits, i.e., private investor owns s percent of shares in plant(s)
of the state corporation:
Ω = (1− s)W + sπA (8)
Following similar procedures, we obtain the equilibrium outcomes in Appendix A. In that case, in stage 0,
the government determines ‘s’ to maximize welfare under non-merged competition and merged competition,275
respectively.
First, from the the detailed analysis and outcomes in the Appendix A1, the welfare under non-merged
competition in mixed markets is as follows:
W ⋆ =
25925− 16750γ − 28000γ2 + 18060γ3 + 9855γ4 − 6345γ5 − 1134γ6 + 729γ7 + η8
(10− 3γ2 + s (11− 5γ2) + s2 (3− 3γ2))
2
H22
(9)
Let s⋆ satisfies ∂W
⋆
∂s
= 0. Then, under non-merged competition, we have the equilibrium outcomes in Appendix
A1. Figure 1 illustrates the following findings: (i) the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in γ, (ii)
21In the recent literature, a few works consider partial privatization in a multiproduct mixed markets. See Dong et al. (2018),
Dong and Wang (2019) and Ba´rcena-Ruiz et al. (2020).
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the strategic level of CSR is non-monotone in γ and (iii) the welfare is decreasing in γ. Hence, both the
optimal degree of privatization, which is determined by the government, and the strategic level of CSR, which is280
determined by the CSR firm, move the same direction when the degree of product differentiation is low. Then,
these two decision variables have the relations of strategic complements, i.e., both levels are decreasing as the
degree of product differentiation increases. However, both levels move to different direction when the degree
of product differentiation is high, i.e., the level of CSR is increasing as the degree of product differentiation
increases.285
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Next, from the the detailed analysis and outcomes in the Appendix A2, the welfare under merged competition
in mixed markets is as follows:
W † =
42 + 77γ + 46γ2 + 9γ3 + ν1
((2 + γ + s(1 + γ))N1)2
(10)
Let s† satisfies ∂W
†
∂s
= 0. Then, under merged competition, we have the equilibrium outcomes in the Appendix
A2. Figure 2 illustrates the following findings: (i) the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in γ, (ii) the
strategic level of CSR is increasing in γ and (iii) the welfare is decreasing in γ. Then, both the optimal degree of
privatization, which is determined by the government, and the strategic level of CSR, which is determined by the
CSR firm, move to the reverse direction irrespective of the degree of product differentiation. Hence, these two290
decision variables have the relations of strategic substitutes irrespective of the degree of product differentiation.
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Then, we have the following comparisons.22
Proposition 6. Partial privatization is always optimal, regardless of merger, but its degree under merger is
lower than without merger. Furthermore, strategic CSR is higher under merger.
Proposition 6 reminds the statement in Proposition 1 that merger will encourage the level of CSR. Thus,295
due to the strategic substitutes relationship, higher level of CSR under merger will bring about lower degree of
optimal degree of privatization.
Proposition 7. Wnm<
>
Wm if γ<
>
γ˜ where γ˜ satisfies that Wnm =Wm and γ˜ ≈ 0.8271.
Proposition 7 reminds the statement in Proposition 2 that merged competition can generate higher social
welfare when products are not close substitutes while non-merged competition enhances higher social welfare300
when products are very similar. Therefore, it confirms that our findings under a fully nationalized SHC still
hold.
4.3. Strategic alliance
In the case that side payments are not allowed,23 we consider a variant of a voluntary collusive agreement
such as cooperative contract on strategic alliance,24 which provide similar effect of merger under imperfect305
contract between the firms.
In specific, we consider the case that both firms agree on the profit constraint that strategic alliance guar-
antees the competition profit of CSR firm by providing some advantages to CSR firm. Note that private firm
B2 is willing to merge but CSR firm B1 does not want even though total joint profits can be increasing. One
possible contract is that both firms agree that CSR firm can choose θ to maximize its profit, not joint profit,
while the CSR firm can get its original profit under competition environment at least. Then, we can define the
following maximization problem of the firms under strategic alliance25
L = VB + µ(π
⋆⋆
B1 − πB1) where π
⋆⋆
B1 =
3
(
5− 3γ +
(
5 + 3γ − 3γ2
)
θ
) (
5− 3γ −
(
5 + γ − 3γ2
)
θ
)
2 (25− 9γ2 − (5− 3γ2) θ)
2 (11)
where π⋆⋆B1 is the profit of CSR firm under non-merged competition. Under strategic alliance, the game runs as
follows: In stage 1, CSR firm B1 determines θ to maximize its profit. In last stage, firms compete with outputs,
that is, B1 and B2 cooperate in production to maximize (11).
22The proofs are provided in Appendix B.
23Note that one of key factors in our analysis is whether side payments between insiders within the merged firm are permitted
or not. That is, from lemma 6, we show that when side payments are not allowed, the merger will not be achieved.
24A few examples include code sharing in airline alliance or co-sharing the transportation routes in logistic industry.
25Note that the optimal solution of program L in (11) violates the profit constraint of CSR firm, pi⋆⋆
B1
≤ piB1. Thus, we can show
that the constraint holds as an equality in the equilibrium analysis, i.e., pi⋆⋆
B1
= piB1.
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As the developed model generates relatively complicated mathematical expressions, we will now use a nu-310
merical analysis in order to show equilibrium outcomes. The results of the calculations for various levels of
parameter γ are given in the following table.
θsa πsaB1 π
sa
B2 W
sa θ⋆ π⋆B1 π
⋆
B2 W
⋆
γ= 0 0.2 0.0625 0.0625 0.65625 0.2 0.0625 0.0625 0.65625
γ=0.1 0.183186 0.0556416 0.0553161 0.615226 0.183186 0.0556416 0.0553161 0.615226
γ=0.2 0.170412 0.0498858 0.0493005 0.579457 0.170412 0.0498858 0.0473399 0.574012
γ=0.3 0.160869 0.0450142 0.0442505 0.548062 0.160869 0.0450142 0.0424015 0.543008
γ=0.4 0.154047 0.0408623 0.0399463 0.520309 0.154047 0.0408623 0.0381435 0.515209
γ=0.5 0.149653 0.0373049 0.0361973 0.495557 0.149653 0.0373049 0.03443 0.490146
γ=0.6 0.147586 0.0342477 0.0328738 0.473292 0.147586 0.0342477 0.0311506 0.46744
γ=0.7 0.147946 0.0316207 0.0298912 0.45314 0.147946 0.0316207 0.0282103 0.446777
γ=0.8 0.151087 0.0293762 0.0271762 0.434842 0.151087 0.0293762 0.0255208 0.4279
γ=0.9 0.157766 0.0274906 0.0246429 0.418215 0.157766 0.0274906 0.0229882 0.410593
Table 1: Comparisons between strategic alliance and independent competition
Superscript sa stands for ‘strategic alliance’. Now comparing the strategic CSR and welfare under strategic
alliance with that under non-merged competition in the Table 1, we get the following findings:
Proposition 8. Under strategic alliance, we get the followings:315
(i) The strategic level of CSR under strategic-alliance is tantamount to that under non-merged competition,
and so does the profit of CSR firm: θsa = θ⋆ and πsaB1 = π
⋆
B1.
(ii) The profit of private firm B2 increases under strategic alliance: πsaB2 ≥ π
⋆
B2.
(iii) The social welfare under strategic alliance is higher than that under non-merged competition: W sa ≥W ⋆.
Therefore, strategic alliance is not only profitable for the private firms but socially beneficial, which is a320
Pareto-improving result.
5. Concluding Remarks
We considered two differentiated products mixed markets comprised of a SHC and a private sector, and
examined the private firm’s decisions of strategic CSR and merger between the two plants. We showed that
the strategic level of unilateral CSR by a single plant under merger is higher than that under non-merger even325
though private firms compete with either a fully nationalized or semi-public SHC. We then showed that in
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presence of a fully nationalized SHC, merged (non-merged) competition with a unilateral CSR can generate the
highest social welfare unless products are (not) close substitutes. We also showed that the level of bilateral CSR
by both private plants is lower than that of unilateral CSR under non-merger competition. However, bilateral
CSR encourages more competition in the market and thus generates lower market prices and higher consumer330
surplus than those of bilateral CSR. As a result, merged competition with a bilateral CSR might yield the lowest
social welfare regardless of products differentiation.
in presence of a semi-public SHC we showed that partial privatization is always optimal, regardless of merger,
but its degree under merger is lower than that under non-merger. Further, we confirmed that our findings under
a fully nationalized SHC still hold.335
Finally, We found that a merger is achievable and always profitable for both private firms if side payments
between insiders within the merged firm are permitted. Nevertheless if such side payments are not permitted,
then a merger is not voluntarily achievable even though its joint profits are increasing. Thus, our result depends
on whether or not side payments between firms are allowed. We then considered a strategic alliance in the case
that side payments are not allowed, and showed that strategic alliance is not only profitable for the private firms340
but socially beneficial.
It should be noticed that we have considered that all the firms are owned by domestic shareholders. However,
due to globalization and open economy in the real world, a mixed oligopoly includes foreign private firms, which
are operated in the country under foreign ownership. Then, not only the objective function of the SHC but also
the strategic decisions on merger and CSR will be affected by the distribution of ownership shares in foreign345
firms. This issue is left for further research.
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Appendix A. The analysis of optimal privatization
A1. Non-merged competition
When a semi-public SHC competes with 2 uniplant private firms, semi-public state corp. maximizes Ω while
private firm B1 maximizes (4) and firm B2 maximizes (2), respectively. Then, the outputs are as follows:
q⋆A1 =
2
(
5− 3γ + s
(
3− 4γ + γ2
))
+
(
−5 + 3γ2 + s
(
−3 + 2γ + γ2
))
θ
H
q⋆A2 =
2
(
5− 3γ + s
(
3− 4γ + γ2
))
+
(
−2− s
(
2− 3γ + γ3
))
θ
H
q⋆B1 =
5− 3γ − 2s
(
−4 + γ + γ2
)
+ s2
(
3− γ − 3γ2 + γ3
)
+
(
5 + 3γ − 3γ2 + s
(
3 + 2γ − 3γ2
)
+ s2
(
γ − γ3
))
θ
H
q⋆B2 =
5− 3γ − 2s
(
−4 + γ + γ2
)
+ s2
(
3− γ − 3γ2 + γ3
)
+
(
−1 + s2
(
−1 + γ2
)
+ s
(
−2− γ + γ3
))
θ
H
where H = 25−9γ2+s
(
30− 14γ2
)
+s2
(
9− 10γ2 + γ4
)
+
(
−5 + 3γ2 + 4s
(
−2 + γ2
)
− s2
(
3− 4γ2 + γ4
))
θ > 0.450
Then, we have the equilibrium outcomes:
θ⋆ = 25−15γ+η1
H1
; q⋆A1 =
75−45γ−30γ2+18γ3+η2
(10−3γ2+s(11−5γ2)+s2(3−3γ2))H2
; q⋆A2 =
80−50γ−30γ2+18γ3+η3
(10−3γ2+s(11−5γ2)+s2(3−3γ2))H2
q⋆B1 =
5−3γ+η4
H2
; q⋆B2 =
40−25γ−15γ2+9γ3+η5
(10−3γ2+s(11−5γ2)+s2(3−3γ2))H2
; π⋆B1 =
(5−3γ)2+η6
2(10−3γ2+s(11−5γ2)+s2(3−3γ2))H2
;
π⋆B2 =
3(40−25γ−15γ2+9γ3+η7)2
2(10−3γ2+s(11−5γ2)+s2(3−3γ2))2H2
2
; W ⋆ = 25925−16750γ−28000γ
2+18060γ3+9855γ4−6345γ5−1134γ6+729γ7+η8
(10−3γ2+s(11−5γ2)+s2(3−3γ2))2H2
2
22
where
H1 = 125 + 45γ − 120γ
2 − 18γ3 + 27γ4 − s4
(
−1 + γ2
)2 (
−9− 6γ + 3γ2 + γ3
)
+ s
(
275 + 87γ − 287γ2 − 39γ3 + 72γ4
)
+ s3
(
75 + 31γ − 134γ2 − 42γ3 + 67γ4 + 11γ5 − 8γ6
)
+ s2
(
220 + 71γ − 294γ2 − 60γ3 + 104γ4 + 9γ5 − 6γ6
)
> 0;
H2 = 20− 9γ
2 + s
(
27− 13γ2
)
+ s2
(
9− 11γ2 + 2γ4
)
> 0;
η1 = s
(
55− 19γ − 15γ2 + 3γ3
)
+ s2
(
39− 11γ − 24γ2 + 4γ3 − 3γ4 + 3γ5
)
+ s3
(
9− 3γ − 4γ2 + 2γ3 − 7γ4 + γ5 + 2γ6
)
− s4(−3 + γ)γ2
(
−1 + γ2
)2
;
η2 = s
(
140− 122γ − 43γ2 + 51γ3 − 6γ4
)
+ s2
(
87− 97γ − 40γ2 + 58γ3 − 5γ4 − 3γ5
)
− 3s3(−1 + γ)2
(
− 6− 4γ
+ 3γ2 + γ3
)
;
η3 = s
(
148− 125γ − 49γ2 + 52γ3 − 6γ4
)
+ s2
(
90− 97γ − 43γ2 + 57γ3 − 5γ4 − 2γ5
)
+ s3(−1 + γ)2
(
18 + 12γ − 8γ2
− γ3 + γ4
)
;
η4 = −2s
(
−4 + γ + γ2
)
+ s2
(
3− γ − 3γ2 + γ3
)
;
η5 = s
(
114− 50γ − 62γ2 + 20γ3 + 6γ4
)
+ s2
(
119− 41γ − 107γ2 + 33γ3 + 20γ4 − 4γ5
)
+ s3
(
54− 17γ − 77γ2
+ 22γ3 + 24γ4 − 5γ5 − γ6
)
− s4
(
−1 + γ2
)2 (
−9 + 3γ + γ2
)
;
η6 = s
(
80− 68γ − 8γ2 + 12γ3
)
− 2s2
(
−47 + 30γ + 26γ2 − 18γ3 + γ4
)
− 4s3
(
−12 + 7γ + 14γ2 − 8γ3 − 2γ4 + γ5
)
+ s4
(
3− γ − 3γ2 + γ3
)2
;
η7 = s
(
114− 50γ − 62γ2 + 20γ3 + 6γ4
)
+ s2
(
119− 41γ − 107γ2 + 33γ3 + 20γ4 − 4γ5
)
+ s3
(
54− 17γ − 77γ2 + 22γ3
+ 24γ4 − 5γ5 − γ6
)
− s4
(
−1 + γ2
)2 (
−9 + 3γ + γ2
)
;
η8 = s
(
127985− 81700γ − 150445γ2 + 95656γ3 + 58093γ4 − 36774γ5 − 7371γ6 + 4644γ7
)
+ s2
(
272233− 175825γ
− 367002γ2 + 237007γ3 + 163540γ4 − 105910γ5 − 25074γ6 + 16470γ7 + 405γ8 − 324γ9
)
+ s3
(
325655− 214926γ
− 520104γ2 + 343214γ3 + 275128γ4 − 182109γ5 − 52886γ6 + 35446γ7 + 2143γ8 − 1545γ9
)
+ s4
(
239329− 160830γ
− 460594γ2 + 308492γ3 + 296764γ4 − 198427γ5 − 73309γ6 + 49158γ7 + 5301γ8 − 3637γ9 − 43γ10 + 36γ11
)
+ s5
(
110433− 74187γ − 257981γ2 + 172094γ3 + 206652γ4 − 136600γ5 − 66382γ6 + 43368γ7 + 7463γ8 − 4793γ9
− 185γ10 + 118γ11
)
− s6
(
−1 + γ2
)2 (
− 31149 + 20112γ + 26263γ2 − 16379γ3 − 5714γ4 + 3367γ5 + 309γ6
− 170γ7 + γ8
)
+ s7
(
−1 + γ2
)3 (
−4887 + 2799γ + 2283γ2 − 1187γ3 − 239γ4 + 110γ5 + γ6
)
+ s8
(
−1 + γ2
)4 (
324
− 135γ − 81γ2 + 30γ3 + 2γ4
)
;
Now in stage 0, the government determines ‘s’ to maximize welfare. The parameter s is complicated to find
explicitly. However, it can be shown that for any γ ∈ [0, 1):
∂W ⋆
∂s
∣
∣
s→0
=
O1
(200− 150γ2 + 27γ4)
3 > 0 and
∂W ⋆
∂s
∣
∣
s→1
= −
O2
(24− 11γ2)
3
(56− 33γ2 + 2γ4)
3 < 0.
23
where
O1 = 190500 + 75000γ − 588250γ
2 − 47600γ3 + 667645γ4 − 67800γ5 − 353745γ6 + 76212γ7 + 88641γ8 − 25758γ9
− 8505γ10 + 2916γ11 > 0;
O2 = 78303232− 34750464γ − 255362048γ
2 + 136585728γ3 + 329929664γ4 − 209027520γ5 − 208809168γ6
+ 159722904γ7 + 62808018γ8 − 64476531γ9 − 5299357γ10 + 13138448γ11 − 1210117γ12 − 1135177γ13
+ 210585γ14 + 30142γ15 − 6753γ16 − 440γ17 + 110γ18 > 0.
These facts imply the existence of s⋆ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂W
⋆
∂s
∣
∣
s=s⋆
= 0. We can also show that ∂
2W⋆
∂s2
∣
∣
s=s⋆
< 0.
Therefore, under non-merged competition, we have the equilibrium outcomes, snm = s⋆; θnm = θ⋆(snm);
Wnm =W ⋆(snm), respectively, which are shown in Figure 1.455
A2. Merged competition
When the two private firms merge, they set up a CC that chooses qB1 and qB2 that maximize (6) while
semi-public SHC chooses qA1 and qA2 that maximize Ω. Then, the outputs are as follows:
q†Ai =
2 + γ + (−1− γ)θ
N
, q†Bi =
1 + s+ sγ + (1 + γ)θ
N
i = 1, 2
where N = 5 + 5γ + γ2 + s
(
3 + 5γ + 2γ2
)
− (1 + γ)(1 + s+ sγ)θ > 0.
Then, we have the equilibrium outcomes:
θ† =
1 + γ + s(1 + γ)2
5 + 3γ + s (5 + 7γ + 2γ2) + s2(1 + γ)2
; q†MAi =
3 + 2γ + s
(
2 + 3γ + γ2
)
(2 + γ + s(1 + γ))N1
; q†MBi =
1 + s(1 + γ)
N1
π†MB =
(1 + s(1 + γ))2
(2 + γ + s(1 + γ))N1
; W † =
42 + 77γ + 46γ2 + 9γ3 + ν1
((2 + γ + s(1 + γ))N1)2
where
N1 = 4 + 3γ + s
(
3 + 5γ + 2γ2
)
> 0
ν1 = 2s
(
53 + 137γ + 125γ2 + 47γ3 + 6γ4
)
+ s2(1 + γ)2
(
94 + 125γ + 46γ2 + 4γ3
)
+ 2s3(1 + γ)3
(
17 + 18γ + 4γ2
)
+ s4(1 + γ)4(4 + 3γ);
Now in stage 0, the government determines ‘s’ to maximize welfare. The parameter s is complicated to find460
explicitly. However, it can be shown that for any γ ∈ [0, 1):
∂W †
∂s
∣
∣
s→0
=
2(1 + γ)3
(2 + γ)(4 + 3γ)3
> 0, and
∂W †
∂s
∣
∣
s→1
= −
2(1+γ)2(154+485γ+616γ2+402γ3+142γ4+26γ5+2γ6)
(3+2γ)3(7+8γ+2γ2)3
< 0.
The fact that ∂W
†
∂s
∣∣
s→0
> 0 and ∂W
†
∂s
∣∣
s→1
< 0 implies the existence of s† ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂W
†
∂s
∣∣
s=s†
= 0.
Moreover, ∂
2W †
∂s2
∣
∣
s=s†
< 0.
Therefore, under merged competition, we have the equilibrium outcomes: sm = s†; θm = θ†(sm); Wm =
W †(sm) which are shown in Figure 2.465
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Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions 4 and 5
From appendix A1 and A2, we have that for any γ ∈ [0, 1) and s ∈ [0, 1]
θ⋆ − θ† = −
γ(1 + s+ sγ)O
(5 + 3γ + s (5 + 7γ + 2γ2) + s2(1 + γ)2)H1
≤ 0
where O = 170 − 30γ − 138γ2 + 9γ3 + 27γ4 + s
(
317− 58γ − 311γ2 + 24γ3 + 72γ4
)
− 2s2
(
− 112 + 32γ +
158γ2 − 25γ3
− 55γ4 +3γ5 +3γ6
)
+ s3
(
72− 49γ − 155γ2 + 54γ3 + 86γ4 − 13γ5 − 11γ6
)
+ s4(1 + γ)2
(
9− 38γ +33γ2 +5γ3 −
10γ4 + γ5
)
470
+ s5(−3 + γ)(−1 + γ)2γ(1 + γ)3 > 0.
Then, using figures 1 and 2, we have the following relations:
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Figure B.3
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